We investigate whether lending by the Islamic Development Bank mirrors Saudi Arabia's political interests based on religious affinity using panel data for its 56 member countries over 
Introduction
The establishment of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is often perceived as an instrument for some countries to achieve influence over others (e.g., Buira 2005, Bird and Rowlands 2006) . The control pursued may be political, commercial, or over the strategies to attain development. Furthermore, some authors claim that the influence over IFIs' lending decisions is essential to guarantee the engagement of powerful countries in international cooperation and therefore the survival of these institutions (Dreher et al. 2009b , Copelovitch 2010 . Not surprisingly, the development aid literature recognizes that major stakeholders' particular interests in borrowing countries are a key driver of resources allocated by IFIs (e.g., Thacker 1999 , Dreher et al. 2009a , Kilby 2011 .
In a similar way, regional powers may approach Regional Development Banks (RDBs) to exert influence over their geographical proximity, as these might be advantageous in terms of participation, scope and coverage (Kilby 2006, Lim and Vreeland 2013) . Saudi Arabia is not an exception and has taken the initiative to found and assume the chief sponsorship of several RDBs most likely to gain leadership in the Arab region and its periphery without the interference of the G7 countries.
1 Unlike the G7, religious affiliation is particularly important for Saudi Arabia to draw political alliances in the Islamic world, making the building of common strategies for this region between both sides a difficult task (Neumayer 2004 , Andersen et al. 2006 , Clark 2012 . For this reason, it is rather challenging for Saudi Arabia to position its interest through the Bretton Woods Institutions, despite its important participation in them (Blanchard and Prados 2007 , Copelovitch 2010 , Bremmer 2013 . 2 In this paper we analyze the lending decisions of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), by far the largest Saudi-led RDB and Arab development agency, and observe to what extent they are driven by Saudi Arabia's political interests based on religious affiliation. 3 We further perform a similar assessment of the World Bank for the same group of countries and over the same time frame, and observe the relative advantage Saudi Arabia might gain by taking on the directorship of an RDB to pursue its own interests.
The limited number of studies on aid allocation by Arab donors agree that predominantly Muslim countries are their main beneficiaries (Simmons 1981 , Hunter 1984 , Neumayer 2003 . This finding can also be extended to the IsDB, as it was set up in 1975 with the very purpose of providing development assistance only to countries affiliated to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and to facilitate their access to Sharia compliant monetary resources (Warde 2000 , Villanger 2007 . Though Islamic solidarity is expected to play a dominant role in IsDB lending decisions, Muslim communities are not homogeneous and recognizing a grasp of countries' affiliation to specific Islamic denominations is crucial to understanding politics in the region. Saudi Arabia, as largest donor of the Bank, pays special attention to the different Islamic denominations in forging political alliances in the Islamic world and therefore we expect this to be reflected in IsDB lending patterns (Clark 2012 , Abdo 2013 .
2 Saudia Arabia is the eighth, tenth and sixth largest capital subscriber in the IMF, IBRD and IDA respectively (IMF 2013 , World Bank 2013a , World Bank 2013b Of particular relevance to comprehending Saudi Arabian interests is the relationship between Sunnis and Shias, which are the first and second largest Islamic denominations and constitute around 95 percent of the total Muslim population (PEW Research Center 2009a . Sunni-Shia relations have been marked by violent conflict and tensions between them are a common phenomenon across the Arab region and its periphery (Luomi 2008, Blanchard and Prados 2007) . This has resulted in the polarization of Islamic societies based on affiliations to these two denominations, and international political support among equal Islamic denominations is the norm (Clark 2012 , Keath 2013 . As for communities affiliated with smaller Islamic branches, cooperation is usually sustained on the acceptance of one or the other's religious fundamentals (Luomi 2008 , Clark 2012 . The Sunni-Shia divide, however, seems to play a less relevant role in the presence of strong social frictions with nonIslamic communities. Sunnis and Shias tend to collaborate with one another during periods of conflict with populations of other faiths in multi-religious countries, arguably to join together against a common enemy (Abdo 2013 , Hunter 2013 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the IsDB, section 3 presents our argument with anecdotal evidence on the polarization of the Islamic world and how it might affect lending decisions at the IsDB. Section 4 introduces our data and estimation strategy, while section 5 presents the discussion of our main results, and section 6 concludes the study.
The Islamic Development Bank
The founding of the IsDB was in response to the interest of the Organization of Islamic The mission of the IsDB is to promote human development focusing on the alleviation of poverty, improvement of health and education standards, and assurance of good governance practices in accordance with the principles of the Sharia law (IsDB 1974). The IsDB was to become the cornerstone of Sharia compliant banking. Financial services delivered within this banking scheme follow three core principles: prohibition of interest rates on loans, share of financial risk between provider and customer, and investing solely in businesses that provide goods and services in accordance with Islamic values (Gafoor 1995 , Warde 2000 . The IsDB exclusively offers financial instruments that are consistent with Sharia law, the most common being interest-free loans, instalment sales, leasings, and financial services referred as istisnaa. 5 Interest-free loans are extended to governments to provide long-term financing for development projects in basic infrastructure and agriculture.
They are free of interest rate charges, however, they do bear a service fee to cover administrative related expenses incurred by the Bank, which must not exceed 2.5 percent per annum. Softer conditions may be provided for certain types of projects in the least developed members, in which the administrative fee ceiling is set at 0.75 percent yearly. Even though service fees might resemble interest rates, these cannot be affected by time horizons of repayments and therefore, in case of default for example, no additional charges can be incurred (Warde 2000) . Throughout instalment sales the Bank purchases the machinery or equipment needed for a certain project and then resells it to the beneficiary adding a mark-up mutually agreed upon by both parties, which must not exceed 5.1 percent yearly. The ownership of the asset is transferred to the beneficiary upon delivery. By opting for a lease, often denoted as ijarah, the Bank procures an asset needed for the production of a good or service, such as factories or power generation plants, and rents them to the beneficiary for a specific period of time. The assets procured remain property of the Bank during the lease financing period and the profit margin ceiling is 5.1 percent yearly. Lastly, istisnaa is a financial instrument in which the Bank produces a specific good to be manufactured from materials available to it, according to certain agreed specifications, to be distributed to the beneficiary at a determined price. Conditions regarding the rate of return and ceilings are the same as for instalment sales. These resources represent less than one fifth of the Bank's total assets, with more than 60 percent of the total being donated by Saudi Arabia (IsDB 2013b). 
The argument
Political and commercial interests of donors have often been recognized as a key driver of resources delivered though IFIs. Regional powers may have the opportunity to gain influence in countries in their vicinity through their control over strategic RDB, as these might be advantageous in terms of participation, scope and coverage (Kilby 2006, Lim and Vreeland 2013) . Saudi Arabia took the initiative to found and financially lead the IsDB, the first and largest Arab development agency in terms of monetary resources and geographical coverage, most likely seeking to position itself in the Arab region and its periphery. Achieving such an outcome through the Bretton Woods Institutions would be very difficult, despite Saudi
Arabia being a major shareholder, as these are virtually dominated by the G7 countries.
Fulfilling and maintaining its role as a leader in Islamic societies is a foreign policy priority for Saudi Arabia and it perceives itself as the principal responsible for the development, cooperation, and support of the region (Al-Yahya and Fustier 2011). As highlighted in the previous section, its substantial contribution in the establishment of the Bank allowed Saudi
Arabia to structure it in a way that development projects it strongly opposes are rather difficult to be approved. Therefore, we expect the allocation of aid by the IsDB to closely mirror the political stance of Saudi Arabia in the Islamic world. 
Saudi interests in the

Data and Methods
We : 1976-1979, 1980-1983, 1984-1987, 1988-1991, 1992-1995, 1996-1999, 2000-2003, and, 2004-2007 . Under this structure, the average number of periods per member country is greater than 6 and for almost half of the recipients there is full information. Another distinguishing feature of our dependent variable is that is has zero observations. The clustering in this lower limit responds to the fact that IsDB aid commitments to certain countries for several years was simply zero.
Analyzing such a model with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator would violate several assumptions, such as zero mean errors, thereby resulting in biased estimates 7 Information on IsDB commitments is at the present date publicly available until 2007. Palestinian Administrated Areas is an active member of the IsDB, however, it falls out the empirical analysis given the unavailability of data for our control variables. 8 A value of one is added to the dependent variable before its logarithmic transformation, in order to keep zero observations. (Neumayer 2002 (Neumayer , 2003 . This feature makes it necessary to use a nonlinear estimation method; therefore we follow Beck and Katz (1995) and adopt a Tobit maximum likelihood estimator with heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors. The following equations are estimated:
Loan it = β 0 + β T R it *T it + β X X it + μ i + γ t + ε it (2) Loan it is the dependent variable, R it is a matrix containing different variables accounting for religion based characteristics of member country i in period t, T it is an indicator measuring religious tensions, and X it is a matrix of control variables. The intercept is referred to as β 0, the remaining βs are the vectors of coefficients of the corresponding matrices, μ i and γ t denote country and time fixed effects respectively, and ε it is the error term.
Note that we include country fixed effects only in (2), which includes the interaction term, because the variables in R it are often time invariant. The usage of two way fixed effects in (1) will not only be collinear with time invariant regressors but will also generate biased estimates with largely time invariant regressors (Beck 2001 Exactly the opposite occurs in Shia majority populated countries: these receive larger IsDB loan commitments in periods of higher religious tension, US$ 9.7 million vs. US$ 10.4 million on average during the same time period. Note that the greatest contrast in terms of religious tension is found in non-Muslim majority populated countries. Similarly, Figure 6 presents the distribution of IsDB loan commitments according to the religious affiliation of the head of state and the level of religious tension. The numbers resemble that of the previous figure, however variation between periods of higher and lower religious tensions are less pronounced, in absolute as well as in percentage terms. These patterns suggest that our second hypothesis is not rejected and Shia member countries seem to be rewarded during periods of conflict with other religions. In the next section we test whether these differences are statistically significant.
We follow the literature on aid allocation by RDBs (Kilby 2006 , Hernandez 2013 , Arab donors (Neumayer 2003 (Neumayer , 2004 ) and other non-DAC donors (Fuchs and Vadlamannati 2013) in selecting our control variables. To reflect recipient needs, we include the total population and GDP per capita in current prices in member countries, both in log form. Total population is expected to be positively associated with loan commitments as this variable accounts for country size. The effect of GDP per capita should be negative given that richer countries are less likely to need aid resources to develop. Ideally, GDP per capita would be given in constant prices to avoid any time trend distortions, however, employing such measurement would reduce our dataset considerably due to data availability. The inclusion of time fixed effects facilitate in greater extent to overcome this issue. We include measures of institutional quality and political stability in member countries to account for merit as a motive for the supply of aid. The first measurement is a democracy dummy variable taken from Cheibub et al. (2010) based on the distinction between regimes where executive and legislative offices are designated via elections and those where they are not. If elections are contested in a member country for a given year the variable takes the value of one in that observation, and zero otherwise. 13 The second measure addresses the incidence of a civil war as found in Gleditsch et al. (2002) . The dummy variable takes the value of one if there is an armed conflict between the state and an organized group causing at least 25 deaths in a single year in a member country, and zero otherwise. Moreover, we include two variables controlling for Saudi strategic interests in member countries, namely Saudi Arabian bilateral aid in constant prices and logarithmic form and merchandise trade relative to GDP. Bilateral aid allocation by Saudi Arabia is a proxy for its political interests, as bilateral aid is often regarded as a reward for political allies (Kilby 2006 (Kilby , 2011 . 14 Merchandise trade relative to GDP accounts for trade openness in recipient countries and also for commercial interests with members of the Bank. Merchandise trade is preferred over total trade due to data availability reasons. We expect these two variables to be positively correlated with IsDB loan commitments. Finally, we include three additional variables as loan demand factors. Obtained from De Soysa and Binningsbo (2012), the first of these factors is the value of oil production in a member country for a given year. Many of the member countries are rich in oil and the 13 For more detailed description and methodology, see Cheibub et al. (2010) . 14 As Saudi Arabia is a recipient country itself, observations for this country consist of the largest bilateral allocation made by Saudi Arabia in each year. The exclusion of this variable in the analysis does not affect results.
greater a country's oil production the lower the likelihood that it will be dependent on development assistance. The remaining two measures control for international reserves as a share of GDP and for debt crises following the dichotomous variable in Laeven and Valencia (2008) . We expect these last two variables to take a negative and a positive sign respectively.
We provide details on definitions and data sources in Appendix 2, and descriptive statistics in Appendix 3. Tables 1, 2 , and 3 present our main findings. Table 1 shows the outcome from our data analysis for equation (1), testing for our first hypothesis. Here we introduce all variables that describe the religious affiliation of the population and that of the head of state described in section 4. Results for equation (2) 
Empirical Results
including our interaction with the Religious Tensions
Index and testing of our second hypothesis are displayed in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 presents this analysis based on population characteristics, while Table 3 presents it based on information on the head of state. All models are initially estimated using all control variables whereas a reduced form of the model is always shown in contiguous columns. The reduced form models control only for recipient needs, namely population and GDP per capita. The three tables report the marginal effects at the mean of the respective covariates, while subsequent graphs exhibit the evaluation of the marginal effects at different levels to address the interaction term in (2). Note that the dataset in Table 1 is one third larger than that of Tables 2 and 3 because the Religious Tensions Index is only available from 1985 onwards.
Values in parentheses refer to p-values.
Column 1 in Table 1 reports results from the regression adding the Sunni and Shia majority population variables, taking non-Muslim populated countries as a baseline category. Tensions Index in different model specifications. The Sunni majority population variable remains significant at the 1 percent level for both models without country fixed effects, and is significant at the 10 percent level for the reduced form model with country fixed effects. It is highly likely that the lower p-values for this variable in both models including country fixed effects are a consequence of this being time invariant. Similarly, the Shia majority population variable is significant at the 5 percent significance level across all specifications, except in one. As noted earlier, here the marginal effect is evaluated at the mean value of the Index.
The Religious Tensions Index enters all regressions with a negative sign, but fails to be significant at conventional levels throughout. The direction and relevance of the interaction term in equation (2) As can be seen in Figure 7 , the marginal effect of the Shia majority population variable on IsDB loan commitments is positive and significant at conventional levels only for lower values of the Religious Tensions Index (i.e. for higher levels of religious tensions). The 17 When the model is nonlinear, as in the case here, the interaction effect cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the sign, magnitude, or statistical significance of the coefficient on the interaction term. Instead, the interaction effect requires computing the marginal effects of the first variable in the interaction term evaluated at different points of the other variable in the interaction term (Ai and Norton 2003) .
marginal effect turns out to be insignificant at conventional levels after the Index takes a value of around 4. Figure 8 confirms that this effect is robust after controlling for country fixed effects, but only until an Index level of around 2.5, as the marginal effects of the Shia population dummy variable remain significant at conventional levels just until this point. A little less than 25 percent of all observations in our data set fall between levels of 0 and 2.5 in the Index. The effect of the interaction term remains similar in terms of size and significance levels when employing the reduced form model in columns 2 and 4. 18 This empirical evidence supports our second hypothesis: Shia majority populated member countries, relative to non-Muslim countries, receive more IsDB resources only when they experience high levels of religious tensions with other non-Muslim religious groups.
Results for equation (2), including information on the religious affiliation of the head of state in member countries, are presented in Table 3 . Similarly to the previous analysis, the Index, reveal another difference. As can be seen on Figure 9 , the effect of the Shia regime variable is only significant at conventional levels for a short range of the Index in the model excluding fixed effects. This is, however, not robust to the addition of fixed effects, as shown 18 For simplicity, these results are not shown and are available upon request.
in Figure 10 . These results hold with the reduced form model. Interestingly, even when religious tensions are present, those countries with a Shia affiliated head of state do not obtain larger loans from the IsDB than non-Muslim countries. Our second hypothesis is therefore rejected when taking into account the profile of the head of state in member countries. Thus, it is never advantageous in terms of IsDB allocation to be a Shia regime. Religious tensions between Shiites and non-Muslims seem to be a concern for the IsDB when the population of a member country is largely Shia, but not when its head of state is Shia affiliated.
We replicate our models reported in Tables 1 to 3 with an OLS estimator and relax some assumptions in our dataset. Our main findings are not altered when implementing the regression with OLS in every case, suggesting that our results are robust to the choice of model specification. Moreover, we use different combinations of the set of control variables.
Leaving recipient needs as fixed controls, we first include merit-based variables, then Saudi
Arabian interests, and finally loan demand factors separately. We observe that the effect of our key explanatory variables remain unchanged, therefore our analysis is robust to the selection of control variables. Due to brevity, we do not report these last two robustness tests, but they are available upon request.
In order to identify the relative advantage for Saudi Arabia to exert influence in its vicinity based on religious affinity through the IsDB compared to the World Bank, we replace our dependent variable with aid commitments from the latter organization. Table 4 . control variables turn out to be significant at conventional levels. Particularly relevant is the incidence of civil war, which is significant at least at the 5 percent level across all regressions. These findings suggest that World Bank lending patterns do not reflect religiously-motivated political dynamics in the Arab region and its periphery, and support our hypothesis that these are inherent to the IsDB due to the dominance of Saudi Arabia in its organization.
Conclusions
The ability of major global players to control IFIs has been suggested to ensure their engagement in international cooperation as well as the survival of these organizations. An affordable alternative for regional powers to exert influence over their vicinity is to assume the leadership of an RDB in contrast to strengthening its participation in a global IFI. In this paper we find evidence of the advantages Saudi Arabia might meet in this respect to position its interests in the Arab region and its periphery. In particular, we observe that Saudi Arabia uses the IsDB to achieve regional hegemony founded on religious affinity. We also find that it does not achieve the same ends with its participation in the World Bank, where it is arguably challenging to coordinate common strategies with other large shareholders for whom religion is not essential for political alliances. (2) and (4) respectively. In these cases, the marginal effect of Shia population (dummy) and Shia regime (dummy) at the mean value of Religious Tensions is reported. Standard errors are robust. P-values are shown in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
